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Abstract This paper outlines a bicontextual account of fictional reports. A fictional report is
a report on something that happens in a fiction, and a bicontextual account is an account that
relativizes truth to two contexts. The proposal is motivated by two considerations. First, it
explains the intuitive truth conditions of fictional reports without postulating hidden fiction
operators. Second, it handles the problem of indexicals in fictional reports better than the
standard accounts.
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1 Introduction
I’ll begin with a simple observation: the sentence
(1) Alexander the Great was poisoned.
has at least two readings, one false and one true. If (1) is used to make a claim about ancient
history, it is false. The consensus among historians, at least, is that Alexander died of typhoid
fever or some other natural cause. If (1) is stated during a conversation about Oliver Stone’s
movie Alexander, however, those of us familiar with the story will accept it as true. At
a critical point in the narrative, Alexander’s closest companions successfully carry out a
conspiracy to poison him to death. But how can we really accept the statement as true, since
Alexander did not in fact get poisoned? It’s obvious enough that we’re assessing a fictional
report, that is a report on some event taking place in the fiction. What’s not so obvious is
why that makes a difference when it comes to the sentence’s truth value.
I want to suggest that the difference comes down to which context we are assessing the
sentence from. Broadly speaking, a context of assessment is any situation from which one
might potentially assess a statement. When we treat (1) as a historical report, the appropriate
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context of assessment is the given situation of utterance. It’s just a straight up claim about
how Alexander met his demise, one that happens to get things wrong. When we treat (1) as
a fictional report, on the other hand, the appropriate context of assessment is an imagined
situation prescribed by the fiction. Now it becomes a claim about what the movie has invited
us to imagine, one that happens to get things right.
The account I’m outlining here is bicontextual, in the sense that it makes use of a se-
mantic framework that relativizes truth to both a context of use and a context of assessment.
This kind of framework is familiar from MacFarlane’s [16] analysis of assessment-sensitive
expressions. According to my proposal, the same technical resources can be used to handle
fictional reports as well. In what follows, I’ll be spending most of my time spelling out two
motivations for the bicontextual account. First, unlike the standard accounts, the bicontex-
tual account captures the intuitive truth conditions of fictional reports without postulating
hidden fiction operators. Second, it gives an explanation of the behaviour we perceive of
indexials in fictional reports, while it is at best unclear how such data can be explained by
some prominent rival accounts.
2 Standard account
According to what I’m going to call ‘the standard account’, the distinguishing mark of fic-
tional reports is that they contain a hidden element.1 When (1) is used to talk about Stone’s
movie, the thought goes, it is merely a compressed way of saying what would have been
expressed by uttering (2).
(2) In the fiction, Alexander the Great was poisoned.
The reason we willingly give our assent to the fictional report (1) is that our intuitions about
its accuracy are really directed at (2). The sentence (2), in turn, decomposes into a fiction
operator and an embedded sentence. In order to explain our intuitive assessment of fictional
reports, then, we need only come up with a plausible semantics for this hidden operator.2
It is at this point that Lewis’ famous proposal enters the picture: the fiction operator can
be understood as ‘a restricted universal quantifier over possible worlds’ [15, 35]. On this
proposal, we treat the semantic value of a sentence embedded under the fiction operator as
something that can take different truth values at different possible worlds. The meaning of
‘in the fiction’ can then be modelled as a function from these semantic values to truth values,
mapping the semantic value of a sentence φ to truth just in case φ is true at every world
compatible with the information provided by the topical fiction. On this line of thought, the
following seems like an attractive semantics:
[[In the fiction φ ]]cw,s,g = 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ s : [[φ ]]cw′,s,g = 1.
Here c is a context of use, w is a possible world, g is an assignment function that maps
variables to objects in the domain of the world of evaluation (used to handle quantifiers),
and s is the set of worlds compatible with the topical fiction.3 Taking this semantics on
1 This paper is exclusively concerned with the tradition that treats fictional reports as genuine statements
— something that may be true or false. By ‘the standard account’, I mean the position that most discussions
within this tradition use as their starting point. Another tradition, inspired by Walton [32], treats fictional
reports as a kind of utterances under pretense that are neither true nor false.
2 See e.g. [9, 471], [15, 37-38], [8, 174], [6, 184], [4, 24], [13, 83], [22, 287], [12, 241], [10, 62].
3 Borrowing a term from Yalcin [33], I have chosen a domain semantics for the fiction operator. That is
not essential, I just happen to think it makes for a smoother presentation than representing ‘in the fiction’ as
a relational operator [25], or using fiction-specifying operators [15].
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board, the sentence (2) has the following truth conditions: [[(2)]]cw,s,g = 1 if and only if, for
every w′ ∈ s, Alexander was poisoned in w′.
I think there is a lot to be said for a Lewisian-style semantics for ‘in the fiction’.4 In
particular, it’s not difficult to see how it can be made to fit with the view that fictions invite
the audience to engage in imaginings about people, situations and events.5 It seems plau-
sible, for example, that when we watch Stone’s movie, one of the things we’re required to
imagine is that (1). The propositional content of this imagining can be represented by the
set of worlds {w : Alexander was poisoned in w}. Now, if we take the intersection of all
the propositional contents that Stone’s movie invites us to imagine (p1∩ . . .∩ pn), what we
get is the set of all the worlds compatible with the information conveyed by the fiction. I’m
going call this ‘the fictional worlds’. So when someone makes a fictional report, they are
in effect reporting on the goings-on in the fictional worlds. The truth conditions associated
with (2) becomes more plausible if we add all this to the background. The phrase ‘for every
w ∈ s, Alexander was poisoned in w’, for example, becomes just another way of saying that
Alexander was poisoned in all the worlds the movie invites us to imagine.
The last part of the standard account is a description of how we go about evaluating
particular statements. The idea is that when we judge a statement’s veracity, what we’re
really assessing is whether it is true relative to its contexts of use, defined as follows:
Truth at a context of use
A sentence φ is true at a context of use c iff for any assignment g : [[φ ]]cwc,s,g = 1,
where wc is the world of c.
To make things more readable, I’ll drop the qualifier ‘at the context of use’ for the most part.
The standard account delivers the desired result. The historical report (1) comes out as true
just in case Alexander was poisoned in wc (which I’m going to assume is the actual world).
Since Alexander was in fact not poisoned, (1) is false on that reading. The fictional report
(1), on the other hand, is true if and only if the sentence (2) is true, and (2) is true just in
case Alexander was poisoned in all the fictional worlds. Since that is indeed what the fiction
asks us to imagine, (1) comes out as true on that reading.
A recurring objection to the standard account is that it’s hard to see how ‘in the fiction’
gets to be part of a sentence’s logical form.6 For one thing, there doesn’t seem to be much
syntactic evidence to speak of backing it up. Here’s how Bertolet expresses the worry:
Now it is true that linguists who support the so-called performative hypothesis have
postulated such a relation between e.g. ‘John loves Mary’ and ‘I assert that John
loves Mary’. . . But this analysis is motivated by syntactic considerations, without
which it would be manifestly implausible, and there is not one whit of syntactic
evidence of which I am aware that would motivate a similar relation between ‘Santa
Claus flies reindeer’ and ‘Some person/story said Santa Claus flies reindeer’. [2,
150]
It’s also far from obvious what other mechanism would be in play. I suppose one could try
to appeal to some process of free enrichment. One might say, for example, that although
‘in the fiction’ is left out for reasons having to do with communicative efficiency, it can
4 Lamarque & Olsen go even further: ‘The notion of ‘in the fiction. . .’ as an intensional operator governing
reports of fictive content is now so common in theoretical writing that appeal to it does not need special
defence.’ [13, 83]
5 I am using ‘fictions invite the audience’ as shorthand for ‘when an author performs an act of fiction-
making, they invite the audience to imagine the information conveyed’. Cf. [7], [32], [29].
6 See e.g. [1], [2], [23] [24], [3], [26], [5].
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be introduced through extraction from information available in the immediate utterance en-
vironment. It is often transparent when we are talking about Stone’s movie, and in those
circumstances we can reliably count on our interlocutors’ ability to understand that by say-
ing (1), what we’re trying to convey is the qualified claim (2). I am, admittedly, skeptical
to this line of thought, but let’s just grant it for the sake of argument. It’s enough for my
purposes to register that the standard account comes with a theoretical cost.
Note that I am not trying to cast doubt on the Lewisian semantics for the fiction operator
as such, nor the idea that there are fiction operators in English. There are indeed many
instances where we do use phrases such as ‘in the fiction’ and ‘according to the fiction’,
and a full-fledged account of fiction discourse would have to include a description of what
these phrases contribute to the semantic value of sentences in which they can occur. The
comment about the standard account’s theoretical cost concerns the postulation of hidden
fiction operators, and the need for an accompanying mechanism that explains how sentences
that do not have a fiction operator in their surface structure still contain such elements in their
logical form.
3 Indexicals
There is, I think, a basic flaw with the standard account: it can’t explain the behaviour
we perceive of indexicals in fictional reports. The standard account’s shortcomings in this
respect have previously been noted by Predelli [25, 283], using (3) as an example.
(3) All Japanese planes could have survived the raid.
To a good approximation, the logical form of (3) is (4).
(4) Possibly ∀x (Actually (x is a japanese plane)→ x survive)
Here Possibly is the familiar modal operator and Actually is an indexical operator that shifts
to the actual world, no matter how deeply embedded.
[[Possibly φ ]]cw,s,g = 1 iff ∃w′ accessible from w : [[φ ]]cw′,s,g = 1.
[[Actually φ ]]cw,s,g = 1 iff [[φ ]]
c
wc,s,g = 1.
Like our first example, (4) has two relevant readings. It can be read as a claim about the
history of the Second World War, in which case the standard account rightly predicts that
[[(4)]]cw,s,g = 1 just in case there is at least one world w
′ accessible from w, such that all the
Japanese planes in wc survived in w′. But (4) can also be read as a claim about Michael Bay’s
movie Pearl Harbour, where it intuitively says something true just in case all the planes
in the fictional worlds could have survived the attack. This is a problem for the standard
account, because it requires that the semantic value of ‘is a japanese plane’ is drawn from
the domain of the actual world.
Let’s flesh out the problem a bit. According to the standard account, when (3) is used as
a fictional report, the sentence to be evaluated is (5).
(5) In the fiction Possibly ∀x (Actually (x is a japanese plane)→ x suvive)
This sentence has the following truth conditions: [[(5)]]cw,s,g = 1 just in case, for every fic-
tional world w′, there is a world w′′ accessible from w′, such that if x is a Japanese plane
in wc then x survived in w′′. That is, after the fiction operator has shifted to the fictional
worlds w′, Possibly shifts to an accessible world w′′. But then Actually takes us back to the
actual world wc for the part ‘is a japanese plane’, and we end up picking out actual planes.
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The planes in wc, however, are not the ones supposed to be surviving in w′′, on the intended
reading — it is supposed to be the fictional planes in w′. So the standard account doesn’t
adequately depict the fictional report’s intuitive truth conditions.
The problem with indexicals becomes even more transparent when we turn our attention
to “pure indexicals” in reports about interactive fictions, such as video games, adventure
books and roleplaying games. On the standard semantics, the first person pronoun picks out
the speaker:
[[I]]cw,s,g = the agent of c.
It is a commonplace observation that people typically talk about their avatars (the characters
they play as) in a first person way. When we report on the goings-on in interactive fictions,
then, we are free to use the first-person pronoun to refer to our avatars, as well as temporal
indexicals to pick out points in the fictional time-line, and locational indexicals to pick out
fictional places. Consider, for example, the following scenario.
Scenario 1
Teddy is playing the space opera video game Mass Effect. His avatar, Jane Shepard,
is trying to romance Kaidan, another character in the story. After they’ve enjoyed an
intimate moment, they embrace in a kiss. Teddy says to his friend: Hey look,
(6) I kissed Kaidan.
The pronoun in (6) is associated with two readings:7
– Ic kissed Kaidan
– Ii kissed Kaidan
This first means just what it would if it had been used in an ordinary conversation: it is true
just in case the speaker, Teddy, kissed Kaidan. On the second it means what it is used in
Scenario 1 to express: something that is true just in case Jane, the person who according to
the story, kissed Kaidan. The problem, of course, is that the second reading is unavailable
if fictional reports only differ from non-fictional reports by virtue of containing a hidden ‘in
the fiction’ element. Whether we prefix (6) with a fiction operator or not, the context of use
remains the same. The operator shifts to the fictional worlds, but the semantics for the first
person pronoun is insensitive to this alteration. The standard account of the fictional report
(6), then, leads to the odd prediction that Teddy has said something true just in case the
fiction invites the audience to imagine that Teddy kissed Kaidan. That can’t be right, though,
since Teddy himself is never even mentioned in the story of Mass Effect.
In their discussion of interactive fictions, Robson & Meskin say that such fictions are ‘in
virtue of their interactive nature. . . about those who consume them.’ [27, 165] In some sense,
then, Teddy should be engaged in an act of self-involving imagining when he is playing Mass
Effect in an appreciative manner. I find their suggestion persuasive, but the self-involving
character of the imaginings associated with interactive fictions does not present an obstacle
to the view that ‘I’ refers to Jane in (6). As an analogy, Robson & Meskin ask us to consider
the difference between imagining that one is flying over Metropolis, like Superman, and
imagining being Superman flying over Metropolis. It is the second kind of “imagination
from the inside” that Teddy is engaged in when he plays Mass Effect. Teddy, then, is not
imagining that his actual self is kissing Kaidan. Rather, he is imagining the possibility of
being Jane, engaged in an act of intimate embrace. So the referent of ‘I’ should still be Jane.
7 Roughly, ‘Ic’ picks out the speaker, and ‘Ii’ picks out the avatar.
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It is just that Teddy also imagines himself being the heroic protagonist. If Robson & Meskin
have identified the proper sense in which interactive fictions are about those who consume
them, the self-involving nature of video games does not mean that the first person pronoun
should pick out the speaker in the actual world.
4 Context of Imagination
A straightforward diagnosis of what goes wrong in Scenario 1 is that we are using the wrong
context. As long as we maintain the assumption that the first person pronoun picks out the
agent of the context, Jane has to be that agent. Since Jane doesn’t report on the fiction herself,
we might be better off evaluating the fictional report (6) relative to another context than the
context of use.
Predellli [23] [24], Reimer [26] and Voltolini [30] [31] have all made suggestions along
these lines. Predelli, for example, says that when we make a fictional report we are ‘talking
“from the point of view of the story” . . . to be represented by pairs containing a context
other than the context of utterance’ [23, 73-4]. Following the same line of thought, Voltolini
writes:
[W]henever the context relevant for the semantic interpretation of an indexical sen-
tence is not its proper context of utterance, that context is. . . a fictional context i.e., a
context which has at least one fictional parameter: a pretended agent, or a pretended
space, or a pretended time, or a pretended world [30, 27].
What does such a context look like? A context representing the point of view of some fiction
obviously won’t include the actual world as one of its parameters. There also aren’t many
fictions, no matter how elaborate, that contain enough information to uniquely pick out an-
other world that deserves to be called the world of the fiction either.8 Fortunately, it’s not too
hard to see how a context representing a fictional point of view ends up with an appropriate
set of worlds. As mentioned, we’re working on the assumption that fictions invite the audi-
ence to engage in imaginings. We called the collective content of these imaginings for the
fictional worlds. When someone makes a fictional report, we can treat them as engaging in
some kind of counterfactual speech; they talk as if the fictional worlds were actual. On this
line of thought, it seems natural to say that the world parameter of a context representing the
point of a view of some fiction should be that fiction’s associated fictional worlds. Let’s use
the term ‘context of imagination’ for contexts of this kind. So the idea we’re running with
for the moment is that fictional reports are evaluated relative to a context of imagination,
instead of their contexts of use.
An attractive consequence of introducing contexts of imagination is that we can dis-
pense with fiction operators. This is illustrated by how the ‘context shift account’ handles
our original example. Recall that we started out with the observation that (1) could be used
to make a fictional report or a historical report. So on the context shift account, (1) is either
to be evaluated relative to the context of use or relative to the context of imagination. A se-
mantic theory underwriting this suggestion must therefore define ‘truth at a context’ without
specifying which context is in play:
Truth at a context
8 This is just another way of saying that fictions are indeterminate. If we happen to live in an indeterminate
universe as well, the context of use won’t determine a unique world either, only the set of worlds compatible
with past events. Cf. (MacFarlane [17])
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A sentence φ is true at a context c iff for any assignment g and for every world
w ∈W (c) : [[φ ]]cw,g = 1, where W (c) is the set of worlds overlapping at c.
We arrive at the following explanation. If someone utters (1) as a historical report, c is the
context of use, and the set of worlds picked out is the singleton set consisting only of the
world of utterance (W (c) = {the actual world}). The historical report (1) will then be true
just in case Alexander was poisoned in the actual world. If we utter (1) as a fictional report,
on the other hand, c is a context of imagination, a context that picks out the set of worlds
that Stone’s movie asks us to imagine. The fictional report (1) will then be true just in case
Alexander was poisoned in all the fictional worlds. Just as the standard account, the context
shift account is able to handle garden variety fictional reports.
Introducing contexts of imagination seems to be a step in the right direction, but I’m
not too happy with abandoning contexts of use. One reason is that there are fictional re-
ports where the first person pronoun does pick out the speaker. The context shift strategy
for dealing with Scenario 1 is obviously to evaluate ‘I kissed Kaidan’ relative to a context
of imagination where Jane is the agent. Even if we suppose that it is successful for that
particular example, the same strategy doesn’t seem to work for the following scenario.
Scenario 2
Tom Cruise is playing the action game Blasted, where the story takes place in a
universe not so different from our own. His avatar, Bully, is a ruthless thug who
ends up killing a lot of people inside a fancy L.A. nightclub. Looking at the corpses
on the floor he notices a familiar face. It’s Tom Cruise! He yells out: Oh no,
(7) I killed myself!
On the intended reading, Tom Cruise says something true just in case Bully killed Tom
Cruise in the fictional worlds. Now, if we evaluate (7) relative to the context of imagination,
we get the mistaken result that both pronouns pick out Bully: (7) is true just in case the fiction
has asked us to imagine that Bully committed suicide. Of course, things don’t fare better if
the context of use is the operative one, because then (7) will say that Tom Cruise committed
suicide. The intended reading is only available if two first person indexicals occurring in the
same sentence can take different semantic values.
Another reason discarding contexts of use might be too radical is that the actual world
sometimes plays an important role. Consider the sentence (8).
(8) Had admiral Yamamoto attacked Pearl Harbour at night, he would have lost fewer planes
than he actually did.
For the point I want to make, it doesn’t really matter what semantics we use for the counter-
factual conditional. I’ll settle for a familiar one:
[[φ 2→ ψ]]cw,g = 1 iff at the worlds w′, where [[φ ]]cw′,g = 1, the world w
′′ most similar to
w is one such that [[ψ]]cw′′,g = 1.
Let’s only consider (8) as a fictional report. The thing note is that the sentence is still am-
biguous. On the one hand, it can be used to compare the number of planes the Japanese
would have lost, had Yamamoto attacked at night, with the number of planes he lost in the
historical battle. Maybe it was voiced in an attempt to show off military knowledge. We
arrive at this reading if ‘actually’ shifts to the actual world: (8) is true if and only if, in the
counterfactual worlds w′ where Yamamoto attacked at night, the number of planes he lost
in the world w′′ most similar to the actual world w′′′ is less than the number of planes he
lost in w′′′. On the other hand, we can also use (8) to compare the counterfactual losses with
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the number of planes he lost in the fiction. You may want to express this if you are simply
interested in telling someone about an alternative path the movie could have taken. We arrive
at this reading if ‘actually’ shifts to the fictional worlds, instead of the actual world. Notice
that if we relativize (8) to the context of imagination exclusively, we only have access to
this second reading. If the context of imagination replaces the context of use, and ‘actually’
shifts to the worlds of the context, then it must shift us to the fictional worlds. There is sim-
ply no actual world available for ‘actually’ to shift to. This is an unhappy result, because
it seems perfectly intelligible to compare what would have happened in Bay’s movie, had
Yamamoto attacked at night, with what really did happen.
5 Bicontextualism
Let’s briefly review the discussion so far. I’ve complained that even if we grant that there
are hidden fiction operators, the standard account is unable to handle straightforward exam-
ples of indexical fictional reports. As a potential remedy, we considered letting contexts of
imagination play the role of contexts of use. The objection against this move was that doing
so leaves us with too few resources. In particular, the context shift account couldn’t handle
examples where the semantic value of an indexical depended on parameters usually reserved
for the context of use.
I now want to try a different approach. As a starting point, let’s retain the notion that
contexts of use represent possible situations in which a sentence can be uttered. So whether
someone is using (1) as a historical report or as a fictional report, the sentence is uttered at the
same context of use. There is still a role for contexts of imagination to play, however, if we
say that the difference between the two types of utterances is a matter of which context the
sentence is assessed from. I’ll say that the historical report is assessed from the same context
in which it was uttered, since we are only considering whether (1) says something that is true
in our actual situation. The fictional report, on the other hand, is assessed from the context
of imagination, reflecting that our concern in this case is whether (1) says something that
is true in the hypothetical situation the movie invites us to imagine. On this suggestion, the
fictional report comes out as true because Alexander was poisoned in the imagined scenario.
It seems appropriate to call this suggestion ‘the bicontextual account’, as it makes use of
a semantic framework that relativizes truth to two context. Appropriating some of MacFar-
lane’s [19] terminology, we’ll say that the target notion for a semantic theory for fictional
reports is not ‘truth at a context of use’, but ‘truth at a context of use and a context of assess-
ment’. The ‘context of assessment’ is here an imagined situation from which a sentence can
be assessed.9 This doubly relativizied truth predicate is defined as follows:
Truth at a context of use and a context of assessment
A sentence φ is true at a context of utterance c1 and a context of assessment c2 iff for
any assignment g and for every world w ∈W (c2) : [[φ ]]c1,c2w,g = 1, where W (c2) is the set
of worlds overlapping at c2.
How does this apply to fictional reports? It’s easiest to start with (1) as an example. When
we evaluate (1) as a historical report, the context of utterance and the context of assessment
are in alignment (c1 = c2). So (1) is true just in case Alexander was poisoned in the actual
9 Although I am using MacFarlane’s machinery, the context of assessment is playing a different role here.
First, a context of assessment is always imagined, so we can never be in one. Second, the context of imag-
ination is tied to the speaker. When another person evaluate a fictional report, they treat it as the speaker’s
context of assessment, not their own.
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world. When we evaluate (1) as a fictional report, however, the two contexts come apart
(c1 6= c2). The appropriate context of assessment is not merely removed in time and place
from the context of use, but wholly imagined; the context of imagination representing the
point of view of Stone’s movie. Allowing that a context of imagination plays the role of c2,
we get the intuitively right prediction that (1) is true just in case Alexander was poisoned in
the fictional worlds. So far the bicontextual account is on a par with the other two accounts
we’ve considered.
Parsons [21] and MacFarlane [19, Ch. 3] have both pointed out that a bicontextual frame-
work lends itself to an assessment sensitive treatment of indexicals. As described above, the
context of assessment is relevant for how we evaluate the accuracy of particular statements,
as it determines the world parameter. But the context of assessment can also be used in a par-
allel way to the context of use in the semantics for indexicals and other context-dependent
expressions. Parsons, for instance, argues that there are two distinct conventions regulating
the temporal indexical ‘now’; one according to which ‘now’ picks out the time of utterance
and another according to which ‘now’ picks out the time of assessment. I’m not taking a
stand on whether he is right about our practices of talking about the present time. What con-
cerns us is the general idea that any context dependent expression could in principle have an
assessment sensitive use in addition to its normal one.
The idea that indexicals might be ambiguous is not novel10, but the bicontextual frame-
work opens up an interesting possibility for fiction discourse. For example, it might be that
when we talk about a fiction, ‘actually’ has one use according to which it shifts to the actual
world, and another use according to which it shifts to the worlds of assessment. This idea has
some intuitive plausibility. The process of evaluating a fictional report requires something
like two mental files, one for the actual situation, the other for the imagined situation. When
we engage in fiction discourse we routinely keep track of both by shifting between which
one we consider actual. The rules for these two uses can be described as follows:
[[Actually1φ ]]
c1,c2
w,g = 1 iff ∀w′ ∈W (c1) : [[φ ]]cw′,g = 1.
[[Actually2φ ]]
c1,c2
w,g = 1 iff ∀w′ ∈W (c2) : [[φ ]]cw′,g = 1.
By the same token, the framework allows for the possibility that there are two uses of the
first person pronoun; one according to which it picks out the agent of the context of use,
and another according to which it picks out the agent of the context of imagination. Again,
this has some immediate appeal. When we play an interactive fiction, we play as one of
the characters in the story. This is reflected in our practices of talking about them in a first
person way. At the same time, it is always open for us to talk about our actual selves in the
first person mode as well, as Tom Cruise does in Scenario 2.
[[I1]]
c1,c2
w,g = the agent of c1.
[[I2]]
c1,c2
w,g = the agent of c2.
The bicontextual account offers a conservative extension of the classical Kaplan machinery.
It preserves the standard semantics in the ordinary cases where c1 = c2, but adds a local
extension in the special cases where c1 6= c2. The latter cases are isolated to instances where
we are reporting on imaginings induced by some fiction. Of course, the fact that we use
a framework that allows for there being two uses of ‘actually’ and ‘I’ does not settle the
question of whether the indexical expressions are ambiguous in this way. So I’ll spend the
rest of the paper motivating this idea by showing how the bicontextual account handles the
examples we’ve encountered so far.
10 [14, 83], [11, 451n12], [28, 87], [20, 337-8].
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When we engage in a conversation about some fiction we carry on as if the story was
real, shifting our perspective from the actual world to the fictional worlds. Once our perspec-
tive has shifted in this manner, ‘actually’ seems to be able to take us to the fictional worlds,
as we witnessed in (4).
(4) Possibly ∀x (Actually (x is a japanese plane)→ x survive)
The fictional report (4) says, roughly, that all the fictional planes could have survived the at-
tack. The problem for the standard account was that if Actually shifts to the actual world, we
end up picking out actual, instead of fictional planes. But if the operator in (4) is Actually2,
we get the desired result: (4) is true (relative to a context of use c1 and a context of imagi-
nation c2) if and only if there is a world w, such that all the Japanese planes in the worlds
of c2 survive in w. Since the worlds of c2 are the fictional worlds, we correctly pick out the
fictional planes.
The hypothesis that there are two uses of ‘actually’ can also explain the different truth
conditions associated with (8).
(8) Had admiral Yamamoto attacked Pearl Harbour at night, he would have lost fewer planes
than he actually did.
The fictional report (8) could either be used to compare the counterfactual number of lost
planes with the number lost in the actual world or with number lost in the fictional worlds.
The bicontextual account is a straightforward explanation for why (8) is ambiguous between
these two readings: it is ambiguous because ‘actually’ is ambiguous. When ‘actually’ is
read as Actually1, we get the first reading: [[4]]
c1,c2
w.g = 1 just in case, in the worlds w′ where
Yamamoto attacked at night, the number of planes he lost in the world w′′ most similar to
the actual world w′′′ is less than the number of planes he lost in w′′′. We get the second when
‘actually’ is read as Actually2, since the actual world is just replaced by the fictional worlds
in the truth conditions.
The bicontextual account is also able to make sense of Scenario 1 and 2. To recapitulate,
in Scenario 1 Teddy was playing as the character Jane in the videogame Mass Effect. After
Jane kissed Kaidan in the fiction, Teddy reported on the event by saying ‘I kissed Kaidan’.
Here’s a way of understanding what’s going on. One thing Teddy imagines while playing
the game is the sequence of events portrayed by the fiction (such as Jane kissing Kaidan).
But in addition to that, the fiction asks him to imagine being the character he plays. This
is, after all, the salient difference between a regular fiction, like a novel, and an interactive
fiction where you take on the role as one of the characters. So the context of imagination
induced by Mass Effect will be one where Jane is the agent, representing the imagined
scenario located on Jane. Teddy conveys this information by talking about Jane in a first-
person way.11 If someone was unaware that Teddy was reporting on the fiction, they would
judge his utterance as true just in case Teddy kissed Kaidan in the actual world. If, however,
they were aware that Teddy was making a fictional report, they would interpret the sentence
as ‘I2 kissed Kaidan’, and judge it to be true just in case Jane kissed Kaidan in the fictional
worlds.
Scenario 2 is interesting because it involves both uses of the first person. In this scenario,
Tom Cruise said ‘I killed myself’ to convey the information that his avatar Bully killed
Tom Cruise in the fiction. The bicontextual account gets the truth conditions right when
11 I should briefly add two clarificatory comments. First, I don’t think it’s metaphysically possible for
Teddy to be Jane. I’m only saying that he talks about the fiction from Jane’s perspective in a first person way.
Second, I am not taking a stance on whether fictional worlds ultimately have to be understood in terms of
metaphysically possible worlds either.
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the sentence is read as ‘I2 killed myself1’: it expresses something that is true just in case
Bully killed Tom Cruise in the fictional worlds. But the bicontextual account has a further
advantage, in that it is able to explain why the sentence (7) could in principle be read in all
the following ways:
– I1 killed myself1
– I2 killed myself2
– I1 killed myself2
– I2 killed myself1
On the first reading, (7) says something that is trust just in case that Tom Cruise committed
suicide. This would be the natural reading had Tom Cruise, for example, written a suicide-
note explaining how he died. The other readings are all cases where (7) is a fictional report.
On the second, (7) says something that is true just in case the fiction has asked us to imagine
that Bully committed suicide. Although that is not intended reading in Scenario 2, it is
something Tom Cruise could have said had the story taken that turn. On the third reading,
Tom Cruise would be saying something that is true just in case Tom Cruise killed Bully in
the fictional worlds. For example, if Bully started shooting in the night club, but Tom Cruise
(in the game) turned around and killed him. On the fourth, and intended reading in Scenario
2, Tom Cruise says something true just in case Bully killed Tom Cruise in the fictional
worlds. The easiest explanation for why these are all possible readings of (7) is that there
are two uses associated with the first person pronoun.
As a final remark, it should be noted that the view presented here comes with a theoreti-
cal cost of its own. While the standard account postulates hidden operators, the bicontextual
account complicates the semantics by introducing an additional contextual parameter. I do
think, however, that the cost is somewhat mitigated by three factors. First, the bicontextual
account is more suited in accommodating the data than its rivals. Second, since the context
of assessment becomes inert in non-fictional discourse, it amounts to a conservative exten-
sion of a plain vanilla intensional semantics. And, third, there is independent motivation for
the inclusion of contexts of assessment, as they might be needed to handle other linguistic
phenomena. On balance, then, it seems like a bicontextual analyis has more going for it than
either the standard account or the context shifting alternative.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I’ve outlined a bicontextual account of fictional reports. The central idea was
that when we use a sentence to make a fictional report, it is evaluated relative to a context
of use and a context of imagination. A context of imagination was a representation of the
counterfactual situation that the topical fiction invites the audience to imagine. I gave two
motivations for this proposal. First, it gave predictions that corresponded to the intuitive
truth conditions without postulating hidden operators. Second, it could accommodate the
observation that indexicals are sometimes sensitive to whether they occur in fictional or
non-fictional reports.
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